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PointLogic Energy, a source for
natural gas pipeline flow and
capacity in the original report,
has recently updated its models
for calculating natural gas flow
in the Tennessee Gas Pipeline in
New England. This model update
has resulted in significant changes
to their previous estimates. Most
importantly, data obtained from
PointLogic Energy in December 2016 supported the finding
that overall net gas flow in the
“Tennessee Gas Pipeline: NY to
MA” was from Massachusetts
to New York from 2013–2016;
their revised models indicate a
net flow during the same period
from New York to Massachusetts. To be conservative, we
have removed analysis of natural
gas pipeline flow and capacity
from this report that relied on
the original data obtained from
PointLogic Energy. Instead, we
use estimates of natural gas pipeline flow and capacity published
in a 2014 ICF International report
that was commissioned by ISO
New England (Exhibit 2-3, pp.
12)a and information provided
by the U.S. Energy Information
Administration.b
a

ICF International, “Assessment of New England’s Natural Gas Pipeline Capacity to Satisfy
Short and Near-Term Electric Generation
Needs: Phase II,” 2014 (see endnote 14).
b

U.S. Energy Information Administration,
“U.S. State-to-State Capacity,” updated
12/31/2015; U.S. Energy Information Administration, “New England Natural Gas Pipeline
Capacity Increases for the First Time Since
2010,” December 6, 2016 (see endnote 15).

Introduction
Over the past decade a number of
factors have transformed global
and national energy markets.
Access to low-cost natural gas
has been a significant part of this
trend. Nationally, natural gas-fired
power generation was expected to
have exceeded coal-fired power
generation for the first time in
2016,1 and in New England about
50 percent of electricity is now
generated from natural gas.2 With
natural gas now such a large part
of New England’s energy mix,
there is a concern that the demand
for heating and electricity during
cold periods will cause spikes in
wholesale electricity prices and
that demand may be greater than

the available pipeline capacity to
deliver natural gas.3 The region’s
utility industry has proposed the
expansion of pipeline capacity to
meet this seasonal increase in the
demand for natural gas.
In light of the trends influencing
energy markets, this perspectives
brief and a related report4 examine
the cost of electrical power in New
Hampshire and New England, the
reliability of the electrical power
system in terms of its ability to
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meet demand, and the risk New
Hampshire ratepayers might face
from various proposals to secure
or increase the supply of electricity.
We find evidence that near-term
levels of demand and supply pose
no threat to grid reliability, that
current pipeline capacity is adequate, and that better contracting
practices and other “soft-infrastructure” changes combined with the
promotion of energy efficiency and
renewable energy will have at least
as large a return on investment as
expanded pipeline capacity, without
exposing ratepayers to higher electricity rates stemming from expensive infrastructure investments.

Cost of Electrical Power
in New Hampshire
In 2015, electricity accounted for
approximately 25 percent ($1.7
billion) of all energy expenditures
in New Hampshire,5 and average retail electricity prices in the
state, at 18.5 cents per kilowatt
hour, were the eighth highest in
the country and 47 percent higher
than the U.S. average (Table 1).
The latter is also the case for New
England as a whole. But despite
these higher rates, the average
monthly New Hampshire residential electricity bill was $115, similar
to the U.S. monthly average of
$114.6 New Hampshire residents
pay 5.5 percent of their income for
overall household energy-related
expenses, similar to the overall U.S.
resident portion of expenditures
at 5.6 percent. In terms of commercial use, the average monthly
New Hampshire electric utility bill
in 2015 was actually lower than the
U.S. average commercial bill,
at $529 versus $671.7

TABLE 1. AVERAGE PRICE OF ELECTRICITY AND AVERAGE MONTHLY
ELECTRIC BILL IN NH AND THE U.S.
IN 2015 FOR THE RESIDENTIAL AND
COMMERCIAL SECTORS
SECTOR

NH

US

Price of Electricity
(cents per KWH)

18.5¢

12.7¢

Electric Bill
(dollars per month)

$115

$114

Price of Electricity
(cents per KWH)

15.0¢

10.6¢

Electric Bill
(dollars per month)

$529

$671

Residential

Commercial

Source: U.S. Energy Information Administration

The relatively higher price of
electricity in New Hampshire and
New England is a result of several
factors,8 including higher transmission and distribution costs that
have resulted from a large number
of new transmission projects (over
600 across New England since
20029), wholesale market rules,
higher air quality standards, historical investment decisions (and
the stranded costs associated with

some of those investments), and
the lack of indigenous fossil fuel
sources that place the region at the
“end of the pipeline” for the transport of fossil fuels.
New England has adapted to
higher prices through energy
efficiency and other energy management investments.10 Even as the
combined gross domestic product
(GDP) for all six New England
states increased by 9.7 percent
from 2005 to 2015, overall energy
use declined by 9.6 percent (Figure
1). During the same period, the
U.S. GDP grew 15.2 percent while
energy consumption fell 3.4 percent
(Figure 2). Energy intensity (energy
use divided by GDP) in New
England is much lower than the
U.S. average (Figure 3), demonstrating that New England consumes
much less energy per dollar of GDP.
In addition, over the past decade,
New England’s energy intensity has
improved by 12.7 percent.
Though New Hampshire residents and businesses pay the same
or less for energy as other areas of
the country, it is important to prevent further increases in the cost
of energy and ideally to reduce the

FIGURE 1. NEW ENGLAND ENERGY CONSUMPTION AND REAL STATE GDP FOR
NEW ENGLAND, 2000–2015

Source: U.S. Energy Information Administration and U.S. Department of Commerce - Bureau of Economic Analysis
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FIGURE 2. U.S ENERGY CONSUMPTION AND REAL U.S. GDP, 2000–2015

Source: U.S. Energy Information Administration and U.S. Department of Commerce - Bureau of Economic Analysis

FIGURE 3. ENERGY INTENSITY FOR THE NEW ENGLAND STATES AND THE
ENTIRE UNITED STATES FROM 2000–2015

Source: U.S. Energy Information Administration and U.S. Department of Commerce - Bureau of Economic Analysis

overall cost of electricity in New
Hampshire. This is especially true
for customer groups adversely
affected by New Hampshire’s
relatively high electricity prices,
including more intensive commercial and industrial users of
electricity, as well as low-income
households who pay a greater portion of their income for energy.

Reliability of the
Electrical Supply
In New England, the share of electrical power generated from natural gas
has grown from 15 percent in 2000
to almost 50 percent in 2015.11 The
region’s electric utility industry has
expressed concern that the demand
for electricity during periods of cold
winter weather will be greater than
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current pipeline capacity to deliver
natural gas, resulting in unreasonably high electricity prices and possible power grid instability. ISO New
England, the organization responsible for coordinating the region’s
power grid, has called for new natural gas infrastructure investment.12
Several studies conducted between
2012 and 2015 have examined
the reliability of the New England
power grid, and none of the eight
reviewed for this study found that
grid reliability is an immediate risk
to New England’s energy security.13
Furthermore, while some studies
have suggested that grid reliability may be an issue after 2021, the
potential challenges are primarily
associated with extreme operating
conditions. The region’s power grid
system operator has demonstrated
success in managing these extreme
conditions and has been proactive
in adapting the rules and procedures
under which power generators operate to further increase grid reliability.
Several lines of evidence support
the conclusion that few if any electrical grid reliability problems are
likely to emerge before 2021. First,
an ICF International report14 estimates natural gas pipeline capacity
in New England at 4.17 billion cubic
feet per day (Bcf/d) (Table 2). This,
combined with peak shaving capacity (1.45 Bcf/d) and direct LNG
import capacity (0.72 Bcf/d), estimates an overall supply capacity of
natural gas of 6.34 Bcf/d in winter.
This capacity value exceeds recent
New England peak winter demand
(compare Table 2 values to the peak
demand of under 5 Bcf/d illustrated
in Figure 4). A separate indicator of pipeline capacity is the sum
of state inflow capacities obtained
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TABLE 2. ESTIMATES OF NEW
ENGLAND NATURAL GAS SUPPLY
CAPABILITIES
Natural Gas
Source

FIGURE 4. DAILY NATURAL GAS CONSUMPTION BY SECTOR IN NEW ENGLAND
FROM 2007–2016 IN BILLION CUBIC FEET PER DAY

Winter Supply
Capability 2016–17
(Bcf/d)a

Pipeline
Capacity

4.17

Peak Shaving
Capacity

1.45

Direct LNG
Import Capacity*

0.72

Total

6.34

Note: * LNG only includes Everett; it does not include
LNG from Northeast Gateway or Neptune. Source: ICF
International. Available online at https://www.iso-ne.
com/static-assets/documents/2014/11/final_icf_phii_
gas_study_report_with_appendices_112014.pdf.

Note: Wintertime consumption by the residential/commercial (blue line) and industrial (black line) sectors peaks in
winter, while consumption by gas-fired power generators (red line) peaks in summer. Source: PointLogic Energy.
Available online at https://pointlogicenergy.com/.

from the U.S. Energy Information
Administration (U.S. EIA) for natural gas pipelines in New England
of 4.96 Bcf/d.15 This represents
an estimate of the total pipeline
capacity that exists in New England.
However, some pipeline in-flow
capacity may not be fully available
due to technical capacity constraints
within the New England natural gas
system.16 The difference between the
state in-flow pipeline capacity and
the estimates of pipeline capacity
obtained from the ICF study17 raises
the possibility that pipeline capacity
may be underutilized and/or that
changes in New England internal
gas pipeline infrastructure might
allow for greater utilization of existing in-flow pipeline infrastructure.
Second, “soft infrastructure”
changes (changes to rules, regulations, or policies such as the
Winter Reliability Program) can
serve as an effective tool for mitigating spikes in wholesale prices.
For example, New England electric utilities that purchase gas to
generate electricity typically do not
contract for firm transportation

services18 to obtain natural gas;
instead, they take what is left
over. This is a major deliverability
challenge and diminishes supply reliability. Specifically, power
generators that rely on natural gas
to generate electricity do not find it
profitable to contract for access to
gas under the current New England
power system rules because firm
gas transportation arrangements
are structured as “take-or-pay”
contracts.19 Under these contracts,
generators are required to pay for
transportation capacity whether
or not they are operating, and
therefore contracts are not desirable. During most days of the year,
generators are able to access gas
and use transportation that would
otherwise be surplus at far lower
cost than contracting for firm
transportation. While this contracting structure works for most
of the year, during days of high
demand it can result in periods
when most of the gas is being used
by sources who have gas contracts
(including natural gas utilities supplying their residential customers

and large industrial users). While
such scarcity can result in price
spikes for natural gas and electricity when demand increases rapidly
due to very cold periods or when
other major electricity generation
stations (such as nuclear power
plants) go off-line, they do not
appear to impact system reliability. For example, during the
high demand for natural gas and
related price spikes that occurred
in January 2014 associated with
the outbreak of the Polar Vortex,
not only did the ISO New England
power grid provide sufficient electricity to New England consumers
during this time period, ISO New
England actually assisted the PJM
(Mid-Atlantic) energy marketplace
by dispatching additional generation units in New England.20
Third, electricity consumption in
New England is expected to decline
by 0.2 percent per year over the
next decade.21 Even with this projected decline, concerns have been
raised about the supply impact of
the 2014 retirement of the Vermont
Yankee nuclear power plant and
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the proposed retirement of Pilgrim
Nuclear Power in Massachusetts
in 2019, as well as the possible
closure of several coal- and oilfired generating plants.22 Requests
from companies to connect electric
generation assets to the grid (interconnection requests) are, however,
plentiful. Between 2016 and 2020,
more than 11,000 megawatts of
capacity (35 percent of total existing generating capacity of 31,000
megawatts23) have been proposed,
and these don’t even include plans
for transmission lines to import
hydroelectric energy from Canada,
discussed below. Almost 60 percent of proposed generation is
natural gas or dual fuel (natural
gas and oil) and about 35 percent
is wind, mostly in Maine. While
not all projects will necessarily be
constructed, the interconnection
requests provide a useful indicator
that there is a considerable amount
of new electrical power production
slated to come online in the near
future. One report suggests that,
from a reliability perspective, the
current buildout plan—evidenced
by the interconnection requests—is
sufficient over the short term.24
Plans to build new transmission lines to import hydropower
from Quebec into New England
include the Northern Pass25 project,
designed to bring 1,090 megawatts
through New Hampshire, and
the 1,000 megawatt New England
Clean Power Link26 transmission
line underneath Lake Champlain
and into Vermont. This range of
new supply could provide diversity in the source of energy used
to power New England’s grid,
an important hedge in light of
rapidly changing global energy
markets. There has been insufficient study assessing the energy

security risk of increasing New
England’s dependence on natural
gas sourced primarily from one
geographic region (Marcellus Shale
from the Appalachian Basin). Yet,
the natural gas export capacity
from that region to other regions
of the United States and globally is
expanding significantly.27

Risks to the Grid and to
Ratepayers
The difference between the sum
of state in-flow capacity obtained
from the U.S. EIA and the estimated available capacity assumed
in the ICF study may be evidence
of some of the potential risks
associated with pipeline investments including that changes in
supply and/or demand can result
in underutilized pipeline. Demand
can end up not matching supply when the pipelines are built,
leaving stranded costs that the
customer ends up having to pay.
(Stranded costs are ones that must
be paid by utility ratepayers if
infrastructure investments become
redundant either through market
forces or regulation.) Given the
long-term cost recovery period of
infrastructure, a poorly informed
decision can have a long-term
impact on electricity rates.
Previous utility proposals have
requested that New Hampshire
electric ratepayers fund the costs
associated with new natural gas
pipelines. But the finding that nearterm energy supply is not a threat
to power grid stability28 provides
New Hampshire policy makers
time (that is, years) to fully consider the costs, benefits, and risks
associated with increasing New
Hampshire’s reliance on one fuel
source from one geographic region.
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Proceeding carefully and
deliberately seems particularly
important if the taxpayer (and
not private capital) will be
funding the new infrastructure.
Proceeding carefully and deliberately seems particularly important
if the taxpayer (and not private
capital) will be funding the new
infrastructure. An example supporting a careful approach is the
investment in 2012 of $409 million
in new pollution control equipment at the Merrimack Station
coal-fired power generation plant
in Bow, New Hampshire. Due to
changing market conditions, the
plant is now valued at just $10 million. New Hampshire ratepayers
are paying for all but $25 million
of the $409 million through a cost
recovery mechanism on electricity
bills.29 This single investment30 will
add 0.4 cents per kilowatt-hour (or
about 2.5 to 3.0 percent) to every
New Hampshire electric ratepayer’s
bill for many years to come. If new
natural gas capacity results in overbuild, and ratepayers are contractually obligated for the costs, the cost
of unneeded capacity will reduce
the savings estimated to accrue to
electric ratepayers.
Responses from an October 2016
Granite State Poll31 show that a large
swath of New Hampshire residents—58 percent—oppose using
ratepayer funds for new pipeline
infrastructure. This view was shared
by almost half of self-described politically conservative respondents (48
percent) and six in ten liberals (63
percent) and moderates (60 percent).
Historically, New Hampshire has
lagged behind the New England
region in renewable energy and
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energy efficiency investment. For
example, in 2015 New Hampshire
had both the lowest total ($26 million) and per capita ($19.20) public
spending on electric efficiency programs out of the New England states.
New Hampshire’s per capita expenditure on energy efficiency programs
was almost 80 percent less than
that of Vermont.32 However, New
Hampshire has made progress in
supporting clean energy investment
with its participation in the Regional
Greenhouse Gas Initiative (enacted
in 2008), the Renewable Portfolio
Standard (2007), and the recently
approved Energy Efficiency Resource
Standard (EERS) (August 2016). The
New Hampshire EERS takes effect
in January 2018 and has established
a cumulative goal of 3.1 percent
electric savings relative to 2014
kilowatt-hour sales. States that have
implemented EERS have experienced three times the energy savings
as states without an EERS.33 This is
an example of the type of policy that
is expected to help New Hampshire
cost effectively meet its energy needs
without paying for large infrastructure projects and dealing with the
associated stranded-costs risk.
The relative net benefits of pipeline expansion, LNG contracting,
and energy efficiency and demand
reduction for New England were
analyzed in a 2015 Analysis Group
report34 that followed a transparent
methodology and made assumptions based on the current state of
the energy marketplace. Results
showed all three scenarios having a significant positive return on
investment for ratepayers (these
returns do not include environmental benefits). The LNG contract
scenario had the lowest annual
cost ($18 million) and the highest
anticipated return on investment
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(150 percent). The energy efficiency
scenario had the highest annual
cost ($101 million) but a return on
investment (145 percent) similar
to LNG. Pipeline expansion had
an annual cost in between these
two scenarios ($66 million), and a
lower but still significant return on
investment (92 percent). In terms
of dollars, the energy efficiency
scenario has the highest return on
investment of $146 million versus
$61 million for pipeline expansion
and $27 million for LNG.
A measure of stranded-cost potential was developed by calculating the
worst-case scenario for dollars at risk
(a measure that indicates the magnitude of risk, not the likelihood). The
LNG and energy efficiency scenarios
have similar worst-case stranded-cost
risk profiles, ranging between $90
million and $101 million. In contrast,
the risk for the pipeline was about
twenty times higher, at $1,980 million.
In response to a request from
New Hampshire energy stakeholders for more New Hampshirespecific information, we developed
a spreadsheet model to directly
compare the net benefits of pipeline expansion versus expansion of
energy efficiency and solar energy.
The assumptions used to develop
the model are detailed in Section
5 of the full report. The total
estimated cost for the natural gas
expansion scenario from 2017 to
2030 was $1.3 billion, and wholesale electricity cost savings (based
on optimistic industry estimates)
totaled $1.6 billion (Figure 5; note
the figure shows annual saving).
This produces a simple return
on investment over the period of
$1.30 for every dollar spent. The
total estimated cost of the energy
efficiency and solar energy scenario
from 2017 to 2030 was $1.1 billion
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and the savings were $2.3 billion
(without discounting for future
value). This produces a simple
return on investment of $2 for
every dollar spent.

New Hampshire residents favor
investment in renewable energy.
New Hampshire residents favor
investment in renewable energy.
In response to a Granite State Poll
question35 on priorities for energy
sources in the future, by almost a
3-to-1 margin respondents gave
higher priority to renewable energy
sources (67 percent) compared
to natural gas (24 percent). Large
majorities of self-reported political
liberals (88 percent) and moderates
(70 percent) preferred increased
use of renewable energy sources,
while self-described conservatives
were as likely to prioritize natural gas (46 percent) as renewable
energy (45 percent).

Conclusion
Our findings suggest that there
is no immediate need for New
Hampshire to expand natural gas
pipeline infrastructure. If the state
wishes to intervene in the market
by obligating ratepayer funds to
reduce wholesale electricity costs,
additional public investment in
major pipeline infrastructure
should wait until a rigorous study
has been completed that models
system wide natural gas flows and
prices. This study should lead to
an improved understanding of
the difference between the technical and economic capacity of
the existing system and explore
opportunities to access more of
the technical pipeline capacity
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FIGURE 5. RESULTS FROM A SPREADSHEET MODEL COMPARING ANNUAL SAVINGS IN NEW HAMPSHIRE BASED ON INVESTING IN NATURAL GAS PIPELINE(S)
VERSUS INVESTMENT IN ENERGY EFFICIENCY AND SOLAR ENERGY

Note: Total projected cumulative savings from 2017 to 2030 are $1.63 billion for the natural gas pipeline scenario
and $2.27 billion for the clean energy scenario. Source: Wake et al., “New Hampshire’s Electricity Markets: Natural Gas, Renewable Energy, and Energy Efficiency,” 2017, Section 5, http://scholars.unh.edu/sustainability/6/.

in cost-effective ways. To date,
no study of which we are aware
has performed the level of rigorous analysis required to justify
a major multidecadal contract
obligating ratepayers, and moving ahead without such a study
would essentially make ratepayers
energy market speculators. Policy
makers also may want to consider
other options that carry less risk
and a better return on investment, including better utilization
of existing infrastructure and
increased investment in energy
efficiency and renewable energy.
Contracts for natural gas capacity that are funded by ratepayers
should be conducted through
a request-for-proposals (RFP)
process, as recommended by the
Public Utility Commission.36
This process should examine all
avenues of gas supply, including
new pipelines, existing pipelines,
and LNG capacity. The underlying costs and assumptions from

vendor submissions should also
be placed in the public domain
for review. Since there is evidence
that costs may be lower from more
effective use of existing infrastructure, an RFP process would allow
the least-cost option to be revealed
through a fair, open, and competitive bidding process.37
Based on the detailed analysis provided in Sections 3 and 4
of the full report, and given the
projected low peak-load growth
and uncertainty in future energy
markets, it is advisable to avoid
expensive market interventions or,
at minimum, to prioritize investments that have the highest return
on investment, lowest projected
cost, and lowest risk. This practice
will serve to keep rates affordable
by reducing spending on expensive utility infrastructure that has
been demonstrated in the past
to increase rates (for example,
Merrimack Station).
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The findings of this study
suggest that the LNG contract
scenario or renewable energy and
energy efficiency investment (up
to the maximal economic potential estimated by the Vermont
Energy Investment Corporation
to be approximately 6 percent
of the total New Hampshire
energy load 38) will be the most
cost-effective alternatives while
also representing low financial
risk to New Hampshire ratepayers. Furthermore, policies
should consider the unintended
or disproportionate impacts on
the populations most negatively
affected by increased energy
prices, including large commercial
and industrial users and lowincome households. In conclusion,
we argue that the while the utility
companies’ stated goal of reducing electricity costs in the State is
admirable, that ironically, their
strategy of expanded natural gas
capacity in the region funded by
ratepayers poses a significant risk
of raising electricity costs further.

Data
Energy data used in this brief are
from the U.S. Energy Information
Administration, ICF International,
Inc. and PointLogic Energy, and
Gross Domestic Product and Price
Index data from U.S. Department
of Commerce, Bureau of Economic
Analysis. We also conducted a
review of prior/existing studies
that focused on natural gas infrastructure, and energy efficiency
and renewable energy implementation. Citations provided in the
endnotes and detailed in the full
report, http://scholars.unh.edu/
sustainability/6/.

		

8

C A R S E Y SCHOOL OF PUBLIC POLICY

Endnotes

1. U.S. Energy Information
Administration, “Natural gas-fired
electricity generation expected to reach
record level in 2016,” July 14, 2016,
https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/
detail.php?id=27072.
2. ISO New England, “2016 Regional
Electricity Outlook” (Holyoke, MA:
ISO New England, 2016), http://
www.iso-ne.com/static-assets/
documents/2016/03/2016_reo.pdf.
3. E. Okun, “New England’s Energy
Situation ‘Precarious,’ ISO Leader Says,”
Union Leader, September 16, 2016,
http://www.unionleader.com/energy/
New-Englands-energy-situationprecarious-ISO-leader-says-092916;
ISO New England, “Natural Gas
Infrastructure Constraints” (Holyoke,
MA: ISO New England, n.d.), https://
www.iso-ne.com/about/regionalelectricity-outlook/grid-in-transitionopportunities-and-challenges/naturalgas-infrastructure-constraints.
4. Wake et al., “New Hampshire’s
Electricity Markets: Natural Gas,
Renewable Energy, and Energy
Efficiency” (Durham, NH: University of
New Hampshire, 2017), http://scholars.
unh.edu/sustainability/6/.
5. This is the latest aggregated data
available from the U.S. Energy
Information Administration (EIA) at
the time of analysis; http://www.eia.
gov/state/seds/seds-data-complete.
cfm#CompleteDataFile.
6. U.S. EIA, “2014 Average Monthly
Bill–Residential” (n.d.), https://www.
eia.gov/electricity/sales_revenue_price/
pdf/table5_a.pdf.
7. U.S. EIA, “2014 Average Monthly
Bill–Commercial” (n.d.), https://www.
eia.gov/electricity/sales_revenue_price/
pdf/table5_b.pdf.
8. Lee Hansen, “Factors Behind
Connecticut’s High Electricity Rates”
(2015n.d.), Connecticut Office of
Legislative Research, https://www.cga.
ct.gov/2015/rpt/2015-R-0108.htm.

9. Some argue that many of these
projects have been undertaken with
limited cost oversight. See B. Scott,
“Transmission Costs,” PowerPoint
slides from presentation at the New
Hampshire Energy Summit, Concord,
October 3, 2016, http://dupontgroup.
com/wp-content/uploads/2013/09/
Commissioner-Scott-TransmissionCosts.pdf; D. Brooks, “Growing
Transmission Costs Are Raising
Region’s Electricity Rates,” Concord
Monitor, October 5, 2016, http://www.
concordmonitor.com/energy-summitNH-5137402.
10. G. Van Welie, “State of the Grid:
2016: ISO on Background” (Holyoke,
MA: ISO New England, 2016),
https://www.iso-ne.com/static-assets/
documents/2016/01/20160126_
presentation_2016stateofthegrid.pdf.
11. ISO New England, “2016 Regional
Electricity Outlook” (Holyoke, MA:
ISO New England, 2016), http://
www.iso-ne.com/static-assets/
documents/2016/03/2016_reo.pdf.
12. Okun, “New England’s Energy
Situation ‘Precarious,’ ISO Leader
Says”; ISO New England, “Natural Gas
Infrastructure Constraints.”
13. P.J. Hibard and C.P. Aubuchon,
“Power System Reliability in New
England: Meeting Electric Resource
Needs in an Era of Growing
Dependence on Natural Gas” (New
York, NY: Analysis Group, 2015),
http://www.analysisgroup.com/
uploadedfiles/content/insights/
publishing/power_system_reliability_
in_new_england.pdf
Black & Veatch, “Natural Gas
Infrastructure and Electric Generation:
Proposed Solutions for New England,”
2013, http://nescoe.com/uploads/
Phase_III_Gas-Elec_Report_
Sept._2013.pdf
La Capra Associates/ Economic
Development Research Group, “The
Economic Impacts of Failing to Build
Energy Infrastructure in New England,”
2015, http://media.gractions.com/5CC

7D7975DFE1335100A9E9B056042840
005CCF0/25e72b85-c007-4b98-a8518b31563c9559.pdf
ICF International, “Access Northeast
Project: Reliability Benefits and Energy
Cost Savings to New England,” 2015,
http://www.accessnortheastenergy.
com/content/documents/ane/Key_
Documents/ICF-Report-on-AccessNortheast-Project1.pdf
ICF International, “Assessment of
New England’s Natural Gas Pipeline
Capacity to Satisfy Short and NearTerm Electric Generation Needs,” 2012,
http://psb.vermont.gov/sites/psb/files/
docket/7862relicense4/Exhibit%20ENJT-15.pdf
Sussex Economic Advisors, “Maine
Public Utilities Commission Review of
Natural Gas Capacity Options,” 2014,
https://www.iso-ne.com/static-assets/
documents/committees/comm_wkgrps/
othr/egoc/mtrls/2014/mar62014/
maine_puc_gas_study_022614.pdf
ICF International, “Assessment of
New England’s Natural Gas Pipeline
Capacity to Satisfy Short and NearTerm Power Generation Needs: Phase
II,” 2014, https://www.iso-ne.com/
static-assets/documents/2014/11/
final_icf_phii_gas_study_report_with_
appendices_112014.pdf
Energyzt Advisors, “Winter
Reliability Analysis of New
England Energy Markets,” 2014,
http://www.epsa.org/forms/
uploadFiles/2CB910000000A.filename.
Energyzt_NEPGA_Final_Report.pdf.
14. ICF International, “Assessment of
New England’s Natural Gas Pipeline
Capacity to Satisfy Short and NearTerm Electric Generation Needs:
Phase II,” 2014, https://www.iso-ne.
com/static-assets/documents/2014/11/
final_icf_phii_gas_study_report_with_
appendices_112014.pdf.
15. U.S. Energy Information
Administration, "U.S. State-to-State
Capacity," updated 12/31/2015, https://
www.eia.gov/naturalgas/pipelines/EIAStatetoStateCapacity.xls; U.S. Energy
Information Administration, “New

C A R S E Y SCHOOL OF PUBLIC POLICY

England Natural Gas Pipeline Capacity
Increases for the First Time Since 2010,”
December 6, 2016, https://www.eia.gov/
todayinenergy/detail.php?id=29032.

23. ISO New England, “Key Grid and
Market Stats” (Holyoke, MA: ISO New
England, n.d.), https://www.iso-ne.com/
about/key-stats.

16. Email correspondence with Warren
Waite, PointLogic Energy, May 4, 2017.

24. La Capra Associates/ Economic
Development Research Group, “The
Economic Impacts of Failing to Build
Energy Infrastructure in New England,”
2015, http://media.gractions.com/5CC
7D7975DFE1335100A9E9B056042840
005CCF0/25e72b85-c007-4b98-a8518b31563c9559.pdf.

17. ICF International, 2014.
18. Firm transportation services or
firm capacity refers to contracts for a
specific volume of natural gas through
the pipeline and therefore those holding
the contract have priority access to that
specific volume of natural gas.
19. N. Hitchins and G. Maguire,
“Generator’s Appetite to Finance
Pipeline Capacity: New England
and South Australia,” NERA
Economic Consulting, 2015, http://
www.nera.com/content/dam/nera/
publications/2015/PUB_Generators_
Appetite_to_Finance_Pipeline_
Capacity_1115.pdf.
20. North American Electric Reliability
Corporation (2014 September)
Polar Vortex Review. Available online at http://www.nerc.com/pa/
rrm/January%202014%20Polar%20
Vortex%20Review/Polar_Vortex_
Review_29_Sept_2014_Final.pdf.
21. ISO New England, “Key Stats: New
England’s Electricity Use” (Holyoke,
MA: ISO New England, n.d.), https://
www.iso-ne.com/about/key-stats/
electricity-use; “ISO New England’s
Forecast Report of Capacity, Energy,
Loads, and Transmission,” CELT Report
(n.d.), https://www.iso-ne.com/systemplanning/system-plans-studies/celt.
22. ISO New England, “Power Plant
Retirements” (Holyoke, MA: ISO New
England, n.d.), https://www.iso-ne.com/
about/regional-electricity-outlook/
grid-in-transition-opportunities-andchallenges/power-plant-retirements;
Elise Harmon, “New England’s Nuclear
Power Plants Are Shutting Down,
and That’s Bad News for Cutting
Carbon Pollution,” November 21,
2016, New England Climate Change
Review, https://www.northeastern.edu/
climatereview/?p=189.

25. New Hampshire Public Radio,
“Northern Pass,” http://nhpr.org/topic/
northern-pass; Society for the Protection
of New Hampshire Forests, “The
Northern Pass,” https://www.forestsociety.
org/advocacy-issue/northern-pass.
26. See New England Clean Power
Link: Project Development Portal,
http://www.necplink.com; Renewable
Energy World, “TDI New England
Receives Major Regulatory Approval
for Clean Power Link,” 2016, http://
www.renewableenergyworld.com/
articles/2016/01/tdi-new-englandreceives-major-regulatory-approval-forclean-power-link.html.
27. For details, refer to Tables 2.1 and
2.2 in the full report, http://scholars.
unh.edu/sustainability/6/.
28. Hibard and Aubuchon 2015; ISO
New England, “Managing Reliable
Power Grid Operations This Winter”
(Holyoke, MA: ISO New England,
2016), https://www.iso-ne.com/staticassets/documents/2016/12/20161205_
pr_iso-ne-managing-reliable-powergrid-operations-this-winter.pdf.
29. B. Sanders, “Merrimack Scrubber at
the Center of Eversource’s Divestiture
Plan,” New Hampshire Business Review,
March 19, 2015, http://www.nhbr.
com/March-20-2015/Merrimackscrubber-at-the-center-of-Eversourcesdivestiture-plan/.
30. B. Sanders, “PSNH turns to NH
Supreme Court in Scrubber Showdown
With PUC,” New Hampshire Business
Review, September 27, 2013, http://

9

www.nhbr.com/October-4-2013/
PSNH-turns-to-NH-Supreme-Courtin-scrubber-showdown-with-PUC/.
31. Public perception based on
responses to energy related questions
from 577 interviews conducted as part
of the October 2016 Granite State Poll.
For full description, see Section 6 of
full report, http://scholars.unh.edu/
sustainability/6/.
32. American Council for an EnergyEfficient Economy (ACEEE), “The 2016
State Energy Efficiency Scorecard”
(Washington DC: ACEEE, 2016), http://
aceee.org/research-report/u1606.
33. S. Nowak et al., “Beyond Carrots
for Utilities: A National Review of
Performance Incentives for Energy
Efficiency” (Washington DC: ACEEE,
2016), http://kms.energyefficiencycentre.
org/sites/default/files/u1504.pdf.
34. Hibard and Aubuchon, 2015.
35. New Hampshire Public Utilities
Commission, “Report on Investigation
Into Potential Approaches to Mitigate
Wholesale Electricity Prices,” Report
No. IR 15–124, September 15, 2015,
http://www.puc.state.nh.us/Regulatory/
Docketbk/2015/15-124/LETTERSMEMOS-TARIFFS/15-124%20201509-15%20STAFF%20REPORT.PDF.
36. Granite State Poll, 2016.
37. See Section 3 of the New Hampshire
Public Utilities Commission report
(ibid) for additional detail.
38. Vermont Energy Investment
Corporation, “Efficiency in New
Hampshire: Realizing Our Potential,”
2013, https://www.nh.gov/oep/
resource-library/energy/documents/
nh_eers_study2013-11-13.pdf.

		

10

C A R S E Y SCHOOL OF PUBLIC POLICY

About the Authors
Cameron Wake is a research professor with the Earth
Systems Research Center, Institute for the Study of
Earth, Oceans, and Space, and Department of Earth
Sciences at the University of New Hampshire. In addition, he is Josephine A Lamprey Professor in Climate
and Sustainability at UNH’s Sustainability Institute
(cameron.wake@unh.edu; Twitter: @TheClimateDr).
Matt Magnusson is a doctoral student in the College of
Engineering and Physical Sciences at the University of
New Hampshire and MBA from the UNH Peter T. Paul
School of Business and Economics.
Christina Foreman is an affiliate research professor
with the Earth Systems Research Center, Institute
for the Study of Earth, Oceans, and Space at the
University of New Hampshire. She now works as
an economist in the Economic Analysis Division at
the Volpe National Transportation System Center in
Cambridge, Massachusetts.
Fiona Wilson is executive director of the Center for
Social Innovation and Enterprise; and clinical associate
professor of Social Innovation, Social Entrepreneurship,
and Sustainability, Department of Management at The
Peter T. Paul College of Business and Economics at the
University of New Hampshire (fiona.wilson@unh.edu).

Acknowledgements
Support for this research was provided by the New
Hampshire Chapter of The Nature Conservancy and
the New Hampshire Community Development Finance
Authority. We gratefully acknowledge the input and
guidance at multiple stages provided by our Advisory
Board, which included: Jesse Devitte (Borealis
Ventures), Kate Epsen (NH Sustainable Energy
Association), Michael Ettlinger (UNH Carsey School
of Public Policy), Mike Fitzgerald (NH Department of
Environmental Services), Richard Grogan (NH Small
Business Development Center), Robert Mohr (UNH
Paul College), Kevin O’Maley (City of Manchester),
Venu Rao (Energy Committee in Hollis, NH), Jack
Ruderman (Revision Energy), and Eric Worthen
(Worthen Industries). The findings and recommendations presented in this brief remain those of the
authors. The authors thank Michael Ettlinger, Michele
Dillon, Curt Grimm, Amy Sterndale, Laurel Lloyd, and
Bianca Nicolosi at the Carsey School of Public Policy
and Patrick Watson for editorial contributions.

University of New Hampshire
Carsey School of Public Policy

The Carsey School of Public Policy at the University of New Hampshire is nationally recognized for its research, policy education, and
engagement. The school takes on the pressing issues of the twenty-first century, striving for innovative, responsive, and equitable solutions.
Huddleston Hall • 73 Main Street • Durham, NH 03824
(603) 862-2821
TTY Users: dial 7-1-1 or 1-800-735-2964 (Relay N.H.)
carsey.unh.edu

